
Post-quantum cryptography standards explained
What are the post-quantum cryptography standards?
Standardization of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms is essential to ensure trust and interoperability, providing well-defined security levels across different systems. Most security agencies reference the NIST algorithms, and some additionally point to algorithms standardized by ISO:
- NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, USA):
NIST is a US federal agency, but its cryptographic standards are used far beyond the United States. Governments, financial institutions, and technology providers around the world treat NIST's post-quantum standards as the practical reference point for migration, in the same way earlier NIST standards such as AES, the Advanced Encryption Standard, became the global default for symmetric encryption. - ISO (International Organization for Standardization):
ISO is an independent, international body that develops and publishes global standards, including those for cryptographic algorithms, to ensure compatibility and security across countries and industries.
These organizations define and maintain standards for PQC algorithms, enabling secure and interoperable cryptographic solutions worldwide.
How are the PQC standards used?
PQC standards are designed to replace today’s widely used asymmetric cryptographic schemes, such as RSA and ECC. These traditional algorithms are essential for secure key exchange and digital signatures, and are used in applications like online banking, payment systems, secure email, VPNs, and digital identity documents. PQC algorithms provide quantum-resistant alternatives for these use cases, specifically covering:
- Key exchange (key encapsulation): Securing the initial exchange of symmetric keys in protocols like TLS, VPNs, and payment networks.
- Digital signatures: Used in many applications, from ensuring authenticity and integrity of transactions, software updates, legal documents, and identity credentials, to secure authentication of user logins, access to secure services, and device authentication in IoT and payment terminals.
By adopting PQC standards, organizations can future-proof their systems against quantum attacks while maintaining secure communication, transaction integrity, and trusted digital identities across a wide range of applications.
How NIST tested and selected PQC algorithms
NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization followed a long, public, and competitive process, not a decision made behind closed doors.
The standardization journey of the first algorithms
2016
In 2016 NIST issued a public call for cryptographers worldwide to submit candidate algorithms. Over the following years, the global research community tried to find attacks to break the candidates, a process called public cryptanalysis, and only the algorithms that survived this scrutiny advanced to the next round.
2022
In 2022, NIST announced the first algorithms selected for standardization: CRYSTALS-Kyber for general encryption and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+ for digital signatures. CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon are based on the hardness of structured lattices, while SPHINCS+ is a hash-based algorithm.
2023
Draft standards followed in August 2023 with minor adaptations and were open for public comment. NIST incorporated that feedback and published the final standards on August 13, 2024:
- FIPS 203: ML-KEM (former CRYSTALS-Kyber)
- FIPS 204: ML-DSA (former CRYSTALS-Dilithium), and
- FIPS 205: SLH-DSA (former SPHINCS)
From 2025
The draft standard for Falcon, FIPS 206: FN-DSA, was submitted for approval by NIST in August 2025, with final publication expected in late 2026 or early 2027.
The standardization process is ongoing
In March 2025, NIST selected HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic), a code-based algorithm, as the only additional KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) for standardization. A first draft standard is expected in the next year.
Additionally, NIST opened a call for additional submissions of digital signature schemes in 2022, seeking algorithms based on different mathematical foundations than those already selected, or alternatively, algorithms with small key sizes. As of August 2026, eight candidates remain under consideration:
- SQIsign (isogeny-based)
- MQOM and SDitH (MPC-in-the-Head signatures)
- The multivariate signature schemes MAYO, QR-UOV, UOV, and FAEST (symmetric-based signatures).
Recently, the lattice-based algorithm HAWK was withdrawn after a newly published attack significantly reduced its security level, effectively halving the required key size. The small key size was one of the main advantages for considering HAWK in ongoing standardization discussions.
The first NIST standards
The first three NIST standards have been published as FIPS 203 to 205. The draft FIPS 206 FN-DSA is expected in late 2026 or early 2027. HQC has been selected for standardization.
FIPS 203
ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber)
Key encapsulation (key exchange)
Structured lattices
FIPS 204
ML-DSA (CRYSTALS-Dilithium)
Digital signatures
Structured lattices
FIPS 205
SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)
Digital signatures
Hash-based
To be published as FIPS 206
FN-DSA (Falcon)
Digital signature
Structured lattices
Selected for standardization
HQC
Key encapsulation (key exchange)
Code-based
FIPS 203: ML-KEM
ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) is based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, a hard mathematical problem in lattice-based cryptography. LWE involves solving systems of linear equations that are perturbed by small random errors, which are believed to be computationally infeasible for both classical and quantum computers. ML-KEM uses a structured variant called Module-LWE, which enables more efficient computations and smaller key sizes without compromising security.
FIPS 204: ML-DSA
ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) is based on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors and Module Short Integer Solution problems, both rooted in lattice-based cryptography. These problems involve finding short vectors in high-dimensional lattices or solving noisy linear equations, which are believed to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. The additional algebraic structure allows for smaller key and signature sizes while maintaining resistance to known attacks.
FIPS 205: SLH-DSA
SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) is based on the security of hash functions and utilizes the concept of stateless hash-based signatures. Unlike lattice-based schemes, SLH-DSA does not rely on hard mathematical problems like LWE but instead constructs its security from the well-studied properties of cryptographic hash functions. The scheme combines several hash-based building blocks, such as Merkle trees and few-time signature schemes, to enable efficient and scalable digital signatures without the need to maintain state. This design ensures strong security guarantees as long as the underlying hash functions remain collision-resistant and preimage-resistant. The robustness of SLH-DSA is rooted in decades of cryptanalysis of hash functions, making it a conservative and reliable choice for post-quantum signatures. As disadvantage to ML-DSA it has significant larger signature and public key sizes.
FIPS 206: FN-DSA
FN-DSA (formerly Falcon) is a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the hardness of the NTRU lattice problem, which is closely related to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning With Errors (LWE) problems. FN-DSA achieves compact signatures and public keys, but has a relatively large private key size. Implementing FN-DSA securely against side-channel attacks is challenging, particularly due to its reliance on floating-point arithmetic. While FN-DSA provides strong security and efficiency, its higher implementation complexity compared to other post-quantum signature schemes increases the risk of implementation errors.
HQC, a second key encapsulation mechanism
HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on the hardness of code-based cryptography, specifically the syndrome decoding problem for quasi-cyclic codes. Its security relies on the difficulty of decoding random linear codes, a problem that has withstood decades of cryptanalysis and is considered resistant to both classical and quantum attacks. HQC enables efficient encryption and decryption with moderate key and ciphertext sizes compared to other code-based schemes, although these sizes are still larger than those of ML-KEM.
NIST selected HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) as a backup to ML-KEM. If a weakness were ever found in lattice-based cryptography, HQC would provide an independent fallback.
The first ISO standards
ISO has also standardized further key encapsulation mechanisms to support global interoperability and security. FrodoKEM, a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism, and Classic McEliece, a code-based encryption scheme, have been standardized in the amendment to the existing ISO/IEC 18033-2.
FrodoKEM
FrodoKEM is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism based on the standard Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. Unlike many other lattice-based schemes, FrodoKEM does not use structured lattices or algebraic shortcuts, but instead relies on unstructured, random matrices over integers modulo a prime. The core operation involves generating and solving noisy linear equations, where the noise (error) makes the problem hard for both classical and quantum computers. This lack of additional algebraic structure is intended to minimize the risk of future structural attacks.
Classic McEliece
Classic McEliece was published as an ISO standard in June 2026. It is a post-quantum encryption scheme based on the hardness of decoding random linear codes, specifically binary Goppa codes. Its security relies on the difficulty of recovering the original message from a ciphertext without knowledge of the secret code structure. Classic McEliece uses large public keys, which are random-looking generator matrices, and relatively small private keys.
In recent months, new scientific publications have identified potential threats to the security of Goppa codes, which form the basis of Classic McEliece. As a result, starting October 2026, the BSI no longer recommends using this algorithm for new applications.
Which regulations already require NIST PQC standards
Several regulatory frameworks reference NIST's post-quantum standards directly, turning them from a recommendation into a compliance requirement for specific sectors.
CNSA 2.0, the National Security Agency's algorithm suite for US national security systems, requires migration to ML-KEM and ML-DSA on a timeline staged by technology category: software, firmware, and networking equipment by 2030, operating systems and cloud services by 2033. Though CNSA 2.0 applies only to national security systems, it has become the benchmark other regulated sectors are expected to follow.
Frequently asked questions
Post-Quantum Cryptography: The complete overview
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